The history of Romanian-Russian / Soviet relations, for more than two hundred years, has known multiple ways of political, diplomatic and military expression. But what decisively marked their evolution was the confrontation between two deeply antagonistic movements that originated in this space at the beginning of the 19th century: Romanian nationalism and Russian / Soviet expansionism. The annexation of Bessarabia in 1812 by the Russian Empire was the beginning of a conflict that has not been resolved to this day. It was inevitable that the tendency of the Romanians to integrate into a unitary state would bring them into opposition with Tsarist Russia, and later the USSR, which included a national territory that belonged to them by right. The difference in points of view by which the two parties justified their rights over Bessarabia attests to the fact that the problem of the territory between the Prut and the Dniester is the cornerstone of the Romanian-Russian relations.
Since its appearance as an international issue in 1812, Bessarabia has been the subject of five international treaties, which enshrined its membership in one or another political mass, either Russian / Soviet or Romanian (and implicitly European): a. The Treaty of Bucharest (1812) between Turkey and Russia, by which Bessarabia was annexed to the Russian Empire; b. The Congress of Paris (1856), assigned the south of Bessarabia and the mouth of the Danube to the Romanian Principalities; c. The Berlin Congress (1878), by which Russia took over southern Bessarabia from Romania; d. The Paris Peace Conference (1919), which recognized the international union of Bessarabia with Romania; The Paris Peace Conference (1947), which strengthened the USSR's right of possession over Bessarabia, following the annexation of 1940 and 1944.
Both the Paris Congresses of 1856 and the Berlin Congress of 1878 and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 demonstrated the irremediability of the two sides' positions on Bessarabia. In the following we will dedicate a block of articles to the Romanian-Soviet diplomatic battles from the interwar period, in which the two sides defended (Romania) or challenged (the Soviet Union) the legitimacy of the act of March 27, 1918.
By the beginning of 1921, it had become clear that the process of re-establishing relations between the capitalist world and Soviet Russia would acquire a scientific character, and the economy would be a political priority. On March 16, 1921, the economic agreement between Great Britain and Soviet Russia was concluded. Political circles in Italy and Czechoslovakia became involved in the same process.
In the case of Romania, this perspective was hampered by the nature of Soviet-Romanian political relations. The insecurity of its eastern border, challenged by the Soviet government, and the issue of the treasury were important elements in determining the evolution of Romania's international situation in an unfavorable direction for its political and economic consolidation. Worse was, however, the fact that this situation, in relation to the objectives of the Soviet foreign policy towards Romania, became precarious and without prospects for improvement, if we take into account the new framework of the foreign position. The first manifestations of this policy did not take long to appear immediately after the November 1, 1920 protest note.
In an interview with Dimineata newspaper, A. Manuilski, the vice-president of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-Polish peace talks, said that Soviet Russia has no interest in attacking Romania, which it considers formidable as an armed force. defensive situation on the Dniester. "But we consider ourselves in conflict with Romania, which illegally annexed Bessarabia.
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| Vladimir Lenin, leader of Soviet Russia (Photo: Central University Library, Iasi) |
The position of the Soviet government on the Bessarabian issue is clearly in the disposition of V.I. Lenin on the editing of the paper "European Part of the Russian Federation". Considering that the territory between the Dniester and the Prut was occupied during the years of civil war and foreign military intervention, the Kremlin leader gave indications to show on the map that "Bessarabia is still part of the Soviet state." From that time until 1940, Bessarabia was drawn on Soviet geographical maps in red, with the inscription "temporarily occupied by Romanian troops."
Noting the return of Soviet Russia to the old intransigent policy towards Romania, we cannot fail to show how justified was the advice given by O'Grady to N. Ciotori on the occasion of the Copenhagen negotiations. The British diplomat called for the conclusion of a treaty with the Soviets as soon as possible, because as soon as they reach agreements with some of the European powers, peace with Romania will be of no use to them and, consequently, they will change. the whole policy.
Between February 24 and November 1, 1920, the Soviet government, due to its external difficulties, was indeed animated by a great desire to complete negotiations with Romania. But with the wastage of this opportunity, another moment was missed: the disposition, hitherto disputed in Moscow, to see in the self-determination of the peripheral provinces a dogma of the Russian revolution. The conception of Romanian diplomacy, according to which the Soviet state was not the successor of the tsarist foreign policy and, as a consequence, the hope that the new principles affirmed by Soviet programmatic documents could have met happily with those who guided Romanian politics was seen. so seriously precipitate.
The new international realities led to the abandonment of the theory of self-determination by the Soviet regime, which was supported by the Soviets only where it was directed against the Allied Powers, for example, in Turkey and Persia. Where the political interests of Soviet Russia were vital, such as in Finland, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, or Georgia, Moscow openly fought against this principle.
The change in the Soviet attitude on the issue of Bessarabia was noticed during the Soviet-Romanian negotiations in Warsaw (September 22 - October 25, 1921). Interpellated by the socialist parliamentary group on the issue of Soviet-Romanian peace negotiations, Take Ionescu explained to the Assembly of Deputies how these negotiations were reached. According to his report, negotiations between the two sides had been going on since February 1920. The town of Reval was initially accepted as the meeting place, and the Romanian delegation was instructed to try to resolve the existing issues. The Reval meeting did not take place. The abstention from a meeting and a possible agreement with Soviet Russia must be seen in light of the alliances that Romania has created during this period.
As England and Italy marched closer to Moscow, France continued the same uncompromising line drawn by Al. Millerand on June 20, 1920, by which "the recognition of the Soviet state will be made with its assumption of responsibility for the commitments of its predecessors to foreign governments." In these conditions, the French diplomacy launched the idea of a sanitary cordon that was to include the neighbouring states of Soviet Russia, and Romania, related to the directives of the French foreign policy, supported the efforts of France to realize this project.
By this time, both Romania and Soviet Russia had adopted the language that defined the character of Soviet-Romanian relations in the Bessarabia issue throughout the interwar period. For Romania, the solution to the secondary problems in the Bessarabia issue was paramount, because it considered it a final settlement in its favour. However, the Romanian side was hit by the Soviet government's refusal in principle to recognize this reality. Soviet Russia is challenging the legitimacy of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania, claiming that this issue will be resolved through bilateral negotiations.
The attitude of the Soviet government in question would be noted with regret by the Romanian delegation, led by C. Finally, since the first meeting of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations in Warsaw. Soviet Representative L.M. Karahan proposed discussing all disputed issues between the two sides. According to the Soviet plan, the agenda of the next conference provided first of all the discussion of the Bessarabian problem and only as an annexe to it, the solution of others arising from this fact. The proposal was following the directive of 21 August 1921, drawn up by V.I. Lenin especially, during the Warsaw negotiations.
The Romanian delegate specified from the beginning of the negotiations that Romania did not in any case and any form accept the legality of the definitive character of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania. Relevant in this sense is the information sent on the occasion of the negotiations of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by C. Filality. His message shows that the Soviet delegate insisted on the issue of Bessarabia because of Ukraine, which the province's fate could not ignore. According to L. Karahan, in a language typical of Soviet diplomacy, the reaction of the Ukrainian masses to the possible lack of attitude of the Soviet delegation towards Bessarabia was invoked.
Noticing the intransigent attitude of the Romanian delegation on the issue of Bessarabia, L. Karahan presented the real offer, for which the Soviet delegation came to Warsaw. He said that if Romania agreed to eliminate its financial claims on Moscow, Soviet Russia would abandon the issue of Bessarabia and that of minorities. To be more convincing in his proposal, the Soviet delegate added that the treasure is no longer intact, being evacuated from Moscow in various cities when there was a danger of Denikin's offensive, and part of it was lost. The Romanian side refused to deal with such circumstances. C. Filality stated that in the given situation the interruption of the negotiations is inevitable. However, the Soviet delegate insisted on continuing the dialogue. The informal meeting between L. Karahan and C. Filality elucidated the causes of these insistences. Soviet Russia wanted to sign an agreement by which Romania would remain neutral, based on reciprocity, in the event of a conflict. L. Karahan explained that the Russian government should present some compensation to the people in exchange for concessions to Romania and believed that a declaration of neutrality on its part was enough to give up Bessarabia: "We know that Bessarabia will remain yours," said the Soviet delegate. to acquire the title deed, which will be of great use to you later, you have to pay. Remember that of all the Russian governments we are the only ones able to give it to you. We are not so naive as to ignore your enormous gain from ratification of the situation by a Russian government, and I do not try to deny that we want to make you pay the price. And that price is neutrality and economic and financial concessions. "
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| Take Ionescu, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Photo: Central University Library, Iasi) |
The correspondence between Take Ionescu and C. Filality on the occasion of the negotiations shows that the Soviet proposals were rejected by the former. He saw in a neutrality agreement with Moscow a limited alliance. L. Karahan's opinion that the Romanian state would have any interest in obtaining from the Soviet government the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania was considered by Take Ionescu a political speculation.
Under these conditions, both the Soviet and the Romanian side went through the formality of maintaining their rights over Bessarabia. The 1921 Warsaw talks were important in shifting the focus of Soviet policy on the Bessarabia issue. During both the 1920 and 1921 negotiations, it was seen by Moscow as a political opportunity. In 1920, the recognition of Bessarabia by the Soviets could have been obtained under the terms of a treaty by which Romania would have recognized Soviet Russia. In 1921 this recognition was to include a treaty of neutrality, as well as the abandonment of claims to the treasury deposited in Moscow. As Romania had no intention of attacking the Soviet state, and the chances of recovering the treasure were slim, Bucharest would have given up little compared to the domestic and international significance of formal recognition by Soviet Russia. of the Dniester border.
With the Warsaw talks, the last manifestation of political opportunism in the Bessarabia issue, it became a matter of principle for the Soviet state. This was serious because it was in line with Soviet Russia's tendency to assert itself in international relations as a great power.
The source: moldova.europalibera.org
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